For second straight year, Houston’s playoff offense fails to launch

“(Deandre) Ayton was switching, (Jaxson) Hayes was switching,” Smith elaborated. “Then, they’d go small. We couldn’t generate penetration or paint touches.”

Relative to 2025, the idea to fix the halfcourt offense was upgrading the role of “top scorer” from Jalen Green to Kevin Durant, all while keeping similar supporting pieces. But Durant, 37, only played in one of six playoff games due to injury.

Meanwhile, the expected supporting cast of veterans never materialized. Fred VanVleet and Steven Adams were both lost to season-ending injuries, and Dorian Finney-Smith — signed to backfill the role of Dillon Brooks, who went with Green to Phoenix in the Durant trade — never appeared healthy.

Those developments left even more responsibility on the plates of Houston’s “young core” of first-round prospects, all added during the franchise’s recent rebuild to begin the 2020s.

With key veterans either unavailable or underperforming, Houston started its final four games against the Lakers with its five most heralded prospects — Smith, Amen Thompson, Reed Sheppard, Tari Eason, and Alperen Sengun — all in the starting lineup. Each is 24 years old or younger.

And collectively, their performances on offense were not nearly good enough to win a playoff series. Even if Game 6 is viewed as something of a shooting outlier, the series-long offensive numbers went as follows:

• Sengun: 20.3 points, 4.7 assists, 3.0 turnovers; 46.5% shooting, 12.5% on 3s, 69.0% on free throws
• Thompson: 19.2 points, 5.7 assists, 2.5 turnovers; 48.8% shooting, 25.0% on 3s, 70.7% on free throws
• Smith: 17.5 points, 1.8 assists; 38.8% shooting, 37.3% on 3s, 76.9% on free throws
• Eason: 13.8 points, 1.7 assists; 47.7% shooting, 33.3% on 3s
• Sheppard: 12.2 points, 4.7 assists, 2.0 turnovers; 30.7% shooting, 29.6% on 3s, 75.0% on free throws

There’s also the question of roster fit, as head coach Ime Udoka alluded to postgame. On offense, neither Sengun nor Thompson is a regular 3-point shooter, which complicates floor spacing. Defensively, Sengun and Sheppard both have limitations. Neither Smith nor Eason is a consistent shot creator or playmaker.

“We do need to address some needs,” Udoka told reporters. “The lack of shooting at times. Whether it’s a backup point guard or (if) our young guys did enough this year to run that when Fred’s back. We’ll take a look at all those things. We’ll have some very interesting conversations. Having a little bit more of a mix instead of some duplicates out there.”

There are no reports of Udoka or general manager Rafael Stone having any job-security concerns, and it’s not as if going 52-30 in an injury plagued season was a total disaster. Both are expected to meet with media members early next week to preview the 2026 offseason.

So, assuming the team’s leadership remains in place, what comes next?

Led by Stone, the Rockets can perhaps look to swap out some veteran role players further down the depth chart — think Jae’Sean Tate, Josh Okogie, and Aaron Holiday — for different player archetypes. Shooting, ball-handling, and playmaking could all be desired attributes.

Maybe the pool of assistant coaches on Udoka’s bench can change, potentially with the team seeking better skills development.

But in light of the extreme offensive futility that ended both of the last two playoff runs, it’s hard to envision assistant coaching changes or low-cost moves around the margins significantly moving the needle. And yet again, the Rockets are not projected to have financial flexibility beneath the NBA’s 2026-27 salary cap.

So, what’s the move? The Rockets could simply bank on continuity and development, with the “young core” getting another year together and perhaps with better health from the higher-profile veterans such as Durant, VanVleet, and Adams.

VanVleet should help mitigate turnovers and organize the offense as a point guard, while Adams’ offensive rebounding prowess inside often provides additional opportunities to score.

But as Finney-Smith showed in 2025-26, it isn’t always a given that players in their 30s will return to full health in their first season following leg surgery. Furthermore, Durant will be 38 years old by the time training camp for the 2026-27 season opens in late September, and it remains to be seen how much longer he can keep playing at an All-Star level.

So, the question becomes: Are those additions enough to get Houston over its current hump and seriously contending for a title? Each of the last two seasons have featured matching 52-30 records and first-round playoff exits, with a lack of halfcourt offense as the team’s obvious deficiency.

And in 2025, VanVleet and Adams were part of a playoff team with that same glaring weakness (though in fairness, they did not yet have Durant).

If largely staying the course isn’t enough, what moves of greater significance might be available? For a franchise that is now 31 years and counting since its last NBA championship, bold choices could be in order.

Similar to the June 2025 Durant deal, the Rockets could attempt to trade for another veteran star, using young players and/or their warchest of future draft assets. But having a top-heavy roster with two aging stars (and the assets that have to go out to facilitate each deal) might significantly reduce the team’s desired timeline for potential contention.

They could perhaps look to move off one or more players from the “young core” in search of a better roster fit, but that plan also carries risk and no clear answers. Sengun, for instance, is a two-time All-Star at just 23 years old. Sheppard is not even two years removed from being the NBA’s No. 3 overall draft pick in June 2024, when he was viewed as a potentially generational shooting prospect.

For a team that already has clear offensive limitations, taking away that type of talent might reduce its upside even more. Moreover, it’s not as if impactful young players on reasonable contracts are readily available via trade.

The Rockets could even take a temporary step back, with the team trading a marquee established piece (such as Sengun or Durant) for an “upside” package headlined by youth and/or future draft capital. But would Rockets ownership, led by Tilman Fertitta, greenlight a major change in direction after the pain of Houston’s recent rebuild?

Generally, acquiring a perennial All-Star and future Hall of Famer like Durant suggests a win-now emphasis, and that’s typically good for business.

Moderate, in-between paths will certainly be available, as well. For example, Finney-Smith will effectively be on an expiring contract, and he can be used to match salary in a trade. Maybe the Rockets can package Finney-Smith, Clint Capela (who fell out of the playoff rotation), and limited future draft capital for a more established role player to fit around the existing team structure.

But would that type of move — and inherently banking on Durant, VanVleet, and Adams to maintain or return to previous form — be enough to finally get over the hump?

As things stand, the Rockets are a good team in an extremely competitive Western Conference, but the last two seasons have shown a clear and consistent playoff ceiling.

There are different paths they can take in hopes of getting past it, but all have pros and cons. Each carries risk.

Yet, after seeing a second straight playoff run end in almost identical fashion, it might be time for the Rockets to consider gambling. With a pivotal offseason ahead, Fertitta, Stone, and Udoka are officially on the clock.

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This article originally appeared on Rockets Wire: For second straight year, Houston’s playoff offense fails to launch