How Bayern Munich Exposed Real Madrid’s Woes

MADRID, SPAIN - APRIL 07: Harry Kane of FC Bayern Munich celebrates scoring his team's second goal during the UEFA Champions League 2025/26 Quarter-Final First Leg match between Real Madrid CF and FC Bayern München at Estadio Santiago Bernabeu on April 07, 2026 in Madrid, Spain. (Photo by Aitor Alcalde/Getty Images) | Getty Images

In the biggest stage in Europe, just one week ago, Los Blancos had been exposed in and out of possession. Real Madrid’s off-ball frailties had no end in sight, whereas under pressure, Arbeloa’s side appeared unable to retain the ball. Both of Bayern Munich’s goals came from dispossessing Real Madrid in the middle of the park and capitalizing on the white team’s chaotic organisation to transition.

After Vinicius Junior missed his backward pass to Carreras for Bayern’s first goal, Joshua Kimmich won the loose ball duel against Aurelien Tchouaméni. Serge Gnabry and Harry Kane’s position between the lines — slightly far from the center-backs — allowed Michael Olise to find Gnabry. Thiago Pitarch and Dean Huijsen attempted to swarm around the German forward; however, he bypassed them with a pass to Kane. A ball combination between the pair enabled Gnabry to slide a through ball between Rudiger and Arnold to the runner, Luis Diaz. The Colombian winger capitalized on Trent’s attention on the ball to sneak behind and guide it home:

The kickoff of the second half highlighted how much Real Madrid came to the clash unprepared collectively. It proves that players’ improvisation under pressure may hit a limit once it is not backed up with good coaching.

After Arda Güler drops to the left half-space, Joshua Kimmich follows him, which vacates the middle of the park for Carreras to move into. Pavlovic comes onto the scene, pouncing on to battle for the knockdown. In the meantime, Kane and Gnabry joined the crew swarming around Tchouaméni and Carreras to regain the ball in transition. Olise, Pavlovic, Gnabry, and Diaz push Real Madrid’s backline rearward, with Kane stealthily making steps backward to put himself in free space at the edge of the box. As a result, he was able to receive Olise’s square pass and neatly guide the ball home:

From a throw-in situation on the left side, Bayern applied a man-oriented press, except for Stanišić and Pavlovic, who operated zonally, ready to join any side as the play developed. Near the corner, Dean Huijsen had no choice but to launch the ball forward. Stanišić and Pavlovic’s positioning allowed them to cage Vinicius, with Dayot Upamecano bossing the Brazilian in the aerial duel. Bayern’s right-back collected the second ball, and Kimmich came short, overloading Güler and Pitarch. With a give-and-go combination with Kimmich, Stanišić was able to enter the space between the lines. In the meantime, Luis Diaz tended to exploit the large space between Rudiger and Arnold, whereas Kane attempted to get in behind Real Madrid’s center-backs. However, Stanišić’s miscued pass went to Rudiger’s feet:

In injury time, Bayern Munich divided Real Madrid’s defensive unit into two parts. Manuel Neuer spotted the white team’s weakness on the right side. Carreras cleared the ball; however, Kane stepping back and away from Rüdiger enabled him to collect the second ball in a free island and drive forward comfortably. On the left side, Trent and Brahim Diaz (late tracking back) left Eder Militao outnumbered by Alphonso Davies and Diaz. The pair bypassed Militao with Tchouaméni confronting Diaz. At the far post, Olise and Stanišić were ready to capitalize on the numerical advantage around Carreras. Nonetheless, the latter was able to wipe out the danger.

From goalkick situations, Real Madrid constructed with a four-at-the-back with a narrow three in midfield and front three who spread wide. The initial structure eased the high-pressing process for Bayern Munich and allowed them to have optimal protection of the center and a good base to shuffle across and throttle Real Madrid near the touchlines.

As time elapsed, Arbeloa’s side changed to build up in a 4-2-2-2 shape, by making Valverde and Güler act as situational tens. In this sequence, as Real Madrid channels the play toward Trent, Pitarch and Güler drag Pavlovic and Laimer across. That frees up the central channel for the hosts to take advantage of:

However, Tchouaméni remained static throughout the process, which led to a possession loss for Kimmich to collect the loose ball. Olise’s narrow position gave him the edge to capitalize on Real Madrid’s gaps and set up Gnabry in a goal-scoring position:

In this scene, despite being trapped wide, Real Madrid was capable of finding a way out against Bayern Munich’s man-on-man high press. Upamecano jumping from his spot toward Carreras contributed to the success of Real Madrid’s process, as Carreras had time and space to assess his options. Kimmich stood still in his position to cut the diagonal passing lane into the center. As a result, Arda Güler dropped in, creating a separation to prod the ball onto Mbappé from first-time touch. The French striker, failing to exert full control of it, gave Pavlovic the chance to dispossess his opponent and turn over. Additionally, Luis Diaz’s off-ball narrow position put him in a situation to exploit the gap between Arnold and Militao. Fortunately, Arnold took advantage of Diaz’s subpar first touch to regain possession:

Real Madrid came up with solutions to Bayern Munich’s aggressive man-oriented high press. However, it was their ball insecurity and inability to retain it under pressure that hindered Arbeloa’s team and allowed Kompany’s side to transition from areas close to Real Madrid’s box. Here, from a goalkick situation, Andry Lunin directly picked out Alexander-Arnold, who, from first-time touch, slid the ball forward.

To elaborate, Real Madrid tended to make use of the space between Bayern Munich’s pressing unit and the backline defenders who took charge of Valverde, Mbappé, and Vinicius. As the ball traveled to Arnold, a diagonal double movement between Brahim Diaz and Jude Bellingham occurred to disrupt their markers and create separation to receive.

After releasing the ball, Arnold immediately proceeded with a run toward Diaz, who passed it backward and pulled wide. Stanišić‘s attention instantly shifted toward Arnold, stripping the ball away to turn over. On the ball side, Real Madrid’s players found themselves in a 4v3 situation. Stanišić released Harry Kane toward the byline. As a reaction, the Real Madrid trio swarmed around Kane to stop him from playing the cut back.

In settled possession, usually Bayern Munich’s far-side winger drifted infield to secure minimum width and make the pitch as compact as possible. That established the prerequisite for Kompany’s side and made them tuned to pounce immediately following a possession loss. By the end of the game, Bayern Munich embodied Jurgen Klopp’s quote as the counter-press being the best playmaker.

Here, after regaining the ball, Militao tended to clip it over the top toward Brahim. However, Harry Kane was alert and immediately retreated toward the ball zone to prevent Real Madrid from counterattacking. Bayern Munich had five players surrounding Bellingham and Diaz, which paved the road for them to hunt the white team. Olise’s inside position served him well in deceiving Carreras and letting Kimmich’s ball roll toward Stanišić. The hosts instantly recovered, which drove Stanišić to recycle to Olise. However, Real Madrid’s weakness lay in their far post as Davies attacked the back-post zone, joining Musiala to outnumber Militao. Alphonso Davies played the ball back to Musiala, who squandered the chance to exacerbate Real Madrid’s situation.

In possession, Bayern Munich’s game plan put more emphasis on generating 1v1 situations for their wingers. Against Real Madrid’s 4-4-2 medium block, Bayern’s fullbacks pushed on, drifting infield to force Valverde and Güler to stay inside, which would enable direct access toward the wide areas. At the front, one of the double pivots stepped back, forming a situational back three and overloaded Vinicius Junior and Mbappé:

By doing that, Bayern Munich ensured that their wingers were in qualitative superiority positions. Not only that, but Kane and Gnabry tended to ignore Real Madrid’s center-backs and drop around Tchouaméni and Pitarch to prevent them from narrowing inside and doubling up on the wingers. Five minutes in, Bayern Munich took advantage of their in-possession setup, as Olise dribbled past Güler:

Harry Kane intentionally positioned himself ahead of Tchaouméni to keep him guessing, which expanded the space between the lines. That saw Olise drive in, which forced Huijsen to foul him at the edge of the box.

When they pushed back Real Madrid toward their goal, Bayern Munich committed numbers in attack. Kimmich and Pavlovic’s positions obliged Mbappé and Vinicius to stay deeper, with Upamecano and Tah adjusting accordingly to pounce on in case of a possession loss. Bayern Munich always looked to create those 3v3 or 2v2 situations, manipulate Real Madrid’s low blocks to create those gaps to penetrate the box. As they came close to the box, they aimed to shrink (minimum width), narrow vertically and horizontally to counterpress, and limit Real Madrid players’ options, force the error (for the turnover), or put Los Blancos in situations where they were obliged to clear the ball away. By doing so, Bayern Munich was able to monitor Madrid’s transitional threats in these scenarios.

High up the pitch, there is no word that can describe Real Madrid’s high press more precisely than shambolic. Against teams with a closer individual quality to Los Blancos, and with good coaching, disorganized structures got punished. Here, Harry Kane’s deeper movements on the right side delayed Arda Güler from joining the front-line players to press Kimmich. On the left side, Gnabry dropped in, tying Tchouaméni’s hands inside.

In addition, Vinicius Junior and Kylian Mbappé operating close to each other gave Upamecano space and time to carry the ball progressively around.

As the ball traveled forward, Gnabry and Kane moved their bodies forward quickly to expose the space between the lines. As Olise received from Upamecano, the pair headed toward the gaps across Real Madrid’s backline. Fortunately, Huijsen recovered and halted Gnabry’s intentions.

As usual, Real Madrid applies a man-oriented high press. Bayern Munich manipulated Los Blancos’s men in a way to put their wingers in isolated situations against the fullbacks. In this sequence, Kompany’s side worked the ball to Luis Diaz, while Gnabry moved forward to drag Tchouaméni and vacate the half-space for the Colombian winger to drift into. That saw the visitors switch the play to Olise, putting him in a 1v1 situation against Carreras. In the meantime, Stanišić, with an underlapping run, drew Güler backward, evacuating the channel for the French winger. With quick body feints, Olise forced Carreras to react and plant his back foot, which allowed the former to access the space inside. Olise cut inside, heading toward the free area at the edge of the box to pull the trigger.

Still three minutes left, Real Madrid intended to apply their high press. Nonetheless, the intention and the execution are night and day. The Bavarian team exploited the gap between Vinicius-Mbappé and the rest by the book, where Kimmich roamed comfortably on a free island. The German midfielder bridged between the pitch’s sides. Bayern Munich generated a 2v2 situation, whereas Harry Kane operated slightly away from the backline. The latter’s position permitted him to receive Olise’s pass and release the runner in behind, Stanišić. Meanwhile, Luis Diaz embarked on a sprint to attack the box and wait for Stanišić‘s cross. However, Militao was able to intercept the pass.

In the advanced stages of the Champions League, the chances of going further shrink as mistakes increase. Not only that, but it is nearly impossible to advance when a team lacks defensive integrity and collective urgency, because errors are rarely allowed to go unpunished. Alvaro Arbeloa confirmed that in his post-game interview: “We made two mistakes, two turnovers, which we had discussed before the match and during halftime that we needed to avoid, and above all, be better prepared to close down if they occurred. Against this type of team, if you make these mistakes, you pay for them. This is what we need to confront.”