NFL Draft grades are ridiculous and often wrong. Here's why they're still useful

Feel free to reference them as you continue reading. Also feel free to point, gawk or laugh because, if nothing else, it's a humble reminder that the draft is a crapshoot. None of us know how it will play out, but I also think that's what makes it so much fun.

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Zachary Pereles

Why one 'great' class rarely changes everything

When I had the Patriots atop my 2021 rankings, it wasn't because I knew Mac Jones would hit or that Christian Barmore would anchor the defensive line. (My pre-draft ranking for each player is in parentheses below.)

1. New England Patriots

R1.15. Mac Jones, QB, Alabama (1.11)
R2.06. Christian Barmore, DT, Alabama (1.29)
R3.32. Ronnie Perkins, DE, Oklahoma (1.32)
R4.15. Rhamondre Stevenson, RB, Oklahoma (3.30)
R5.33. Cameron McGrone, LB, Michigan (4.15)
R6.04. Joshuah Bledsoe, S, Missouri (5.25)
R6.13. William Sherman, OT, Colorado (7.15)
R7.14. Tre Nixon, WR, UCF (PFA)

It was because, relative to my board, New England maximized value by landing a quarterback I viewed as a top-15 player, then following it up with Barmore and Ronnie Perkins at spots that felt like steals. At the time, that class represented alignment between value and need, projection and process.

Perkins, it should be noted, was one of my favorite players in the class. He was a juiced-up college pass rusher who struggled to get on the field in New England, in part because of injuries. He last appeared in an NFL game with Denver in 2023 and has been out of the league since 2024 without recording a sack.

To reiterate: We just don't know.

The same dynamic showed up again in 2023. I had the Steelers at No. 1, and it was easy to see why: Broderick Jones in Round 1, Joey Porter Jr. early in Round 2, followed by Keeanu Benton and Darnell Washington. (Reminder: my pre-draft ranking for each player is in parentheses below.)

1. Pittsburgh Steelers

R1.14. Broderick Jones, OT, Georgia (1.14)
R2.01. Joey Porter Jr., CB, Penn State (1.15)
R2.18. Keeanu Benton, DL, Wisconsin (3.29)
R3.30. Darnell Washington, TE, Georgia (2.21)
R4.30. Nick Herbig, LB, Wisconsin (2.18)
R7.24. Cory Trice, CB, Purdue (3.22)
R7.34. Spencer Anderson, OG, Maryland (6.12)

It was a class built on value and physicality, with multiple players coming off the board later than I expected based on my big board -- the kind of haul that signals a disciplined, coherent approach to team building: filling needs at the top while adding value and depth with subsequent selections.

Meanwhile, I had the Cowboys at the bottom.

32. Dallas Cowboys

R1.26. Mazi Smith, DL, Michigan (2.27)
R2.27. Luke Schoonmaker, TE, Michigan (4.19)
R3.27. DeMarvion Overshown, LB, Texas (4.29)
R4.27. Viliami Fehoko, EDGE, San Jose State (5.14)
R5.34. Asim Richards, OT, North Carolina (7.14)
R6.01. Eric Scott Jr., CB, Southern Miss (6.01)
R6.35. Deuce Vaughn, RB, Kansas State (7.30)
R7.27. Jalen Brooks, WR, South Carolina (UDFA)

They took Mazi Smith in Round 1, Luke Schoonmaker in Round 2 and DeMarvion Overshown a round later. My evaluation wasn't that those players couldn't play; it was that, relative to my board, the value didn't line up (and I wasn't a huge fan of Smith coming out of Michigan).

And yet, whether that class ultimately succeeded hinged far more on variables Dallas controlled -- like how those players were developed regardless of where I had them slotted before the draft -- and variables it didn't.

That's the balancing act. Draft grades measure process, not outcome.

And even when the process looks questionable, it can still work. The Rams were a perfect example. In 2021, I graded their class dead last largely because, in a group headlined by second-round pick Tutu Atwell, the value didn't align with my draft grades; I had Atwell as a mid-fourth-rounder.

This is where it's worth reiterating a few things: I'm one person evaluating these players throughout the pre-draft process -- from the previous summer through last-minute 30 visits. I talk to league sources and gather intel on injuries and off-field concerns.

But I'm not in draft meetings. I'm not building a roster. I'm not operating with team-specific needs. The Rams were. And the fact that some guy named Ryan Wilson disagreed probably didn't cause them to lose any sleep.

32. Los Angeles Rams

R2.25. Tutu Atwell, WR, Louisville (4.15)
R3.39. Ernest Jones, LB, South Carolina (5.15)
R4.12. Bobby Brown III, DT, Texas A&M (4.24)
R4.25. Robert Rochell, CB, Central Arkansas (4.25)
R4.36. Jacob Harris, WR, UCF (5.29)
R5.30. Earnest Brown IV, DE, Northwestern (7.15)
R7.05. Jake Funk, RB, Maryland (UDFA)
R7.21. Ben Skowronek, WR, Notre Dame (7.15)
R7.24. Chris Garrett, LB, Concordia University St Paul (UDFA)

But a couple of years later, that same organization found Puka Nacua in the fifth round of the 2023 draft, along with starters and contributors Steve Avila, Kobie Turner, Byron Young, Warren McClendon and Davis Allen. (I ranked the Rams' class 10th-best in 2023.) The narrative shifts -- not because the grading process was wrong, but because development, usage and organizational context filled in the gaps.

What five years of draft grades reveal

In the table below, you'll see my post-draft ranking for every team from 2021-2025. You'll also see, in the last two columns, each team's winning percentage from 2022-23 and 2024-25.

It's an effort to capture whether there's any discernible relationship between a good (or bad) draft class and a better (or worse) record in the season or two that follows.

My draft grades for some teams, like the Dolphins, were neither spectacular nor disastrous; in the last six years, I never had Miami higher than 12th or lower than 20th.

Others, like the Patriots, had wild swings from No. 1 in 2021 to 30th in 2023 and 2024. Those shifts don't solely reflect talent evaluation; they reflect philosophical shifts, risk tolerance and, at times, organizational instability.

And then there's the myth that one great draft can fix everything, that a team is "one class away." I've had teams like the Raiders or Titans with top-tier classes in recent years. (Las Vegas ranked eighth in both 2022 and 2023 and third in 2025 and 2026; Tennessee was second in 2025 and seventh in 2026.)

And yet they were still objectively bad football teams based on their records. The missing pieces weren't talent alone; they were organizational alignment, quarterback play, coaching continuity and health.

And that brings me back to the core limitation of draft grades: I'm evaluating decisions as if every team is starting from the same place. They're not.

Quarterbacks and context change everything

The NFL doesn't stop once the draft ends. Rosters are ever-evolving, sometimes dramatically, between then and Week 1, and even more so over the next two or three seasons. Coaching staffs change. Schemes shift. Quarterbacks develop or regress. Injuries happen.

And those variables -- the ones that actually determine success on Sundays -- are largely unknowable at the time I'm handing out grades.

That's why it's both fun and instructive to look a little deeper. In searching for any correlation between my draft grades in one year and winning percentage over the next two seasons ... well, it's nonexistent. There is no correlation. None.

In other words, how a team "did" in April has very little immediate connection to how it performs in the fall.

That could be a function of my draft grades being off, which is fair. But anecdotally, I'd imagine most draft grades aren't all that dissimilar because, at the end of the day, if a team fills needs with generally agreed-upon players taken in a certain range, it's hard not to give that draft a thumbs up.

But I don't think that's an indictment of the grading process; it's a reflection of how complex team building really is. You can see this more clearly when looking at individual teams.

I gave the Eagles, for example, strong draft grades early in the window (they had top-six classes in both 2021 and 2022), yet they remained dominant even as their grades fluctuated in subsequent years, winning 73.5% of their games from 2022-23 and 2024-25. Their success wasn't tied to any single draft; it was the result of hitting on a quarterback, building along both lines, supplementing through free agency and maintaining organizational continuity.

Even within those strong classes, the limits of this exercise show up. Drafting DeVonta Smith and Landon Dickerson made perfect sense on paper in 2021 -- elite talent at premium positions -- but whether that class ultimately "hit" had less to do with those April decisions and more to do with how those players developed, how they were deployed and how the roster evolved around them.

I say it all the time: Put Patrick Mahomes on the Browns and let's see how many Super Bowls he has. Cleveland took Myles Garrett No. 1 overall that year, and Garrett is one of the best players in the league and a likely future Hall of Famer. He's also won one playoff game in nine seasons and has been part of teams that won five, three and zero games in a season. It's an oversimplification, but that's the point.

On the other side, teams like the Raiders and Titans illustrate the opposite dynamic. Even though I had both near the top in recent years, they've struggled badly in the standings, with win percentages hovering around 20% or worse in the 2024-25 window.

If draft grades were directly predictive, those teams should have been on the rise. Instead, they fell apart, which highlights an important truth: Acquiring talent is only one piece of the puzzle.

Quarterback play, in particular, distorts everything.

Teams like the Bills and Chiefs prove it. Despite draft grades all over the map, both franchises win consistently. The Chiefs, for example, followed an all-time great 2022 class -- Trent McDuffie, George Karlaftis, Isiah Pacheco, Jaylen Watson, Bryan Cook and Leo Chenal -- with a much shakier 2023 haul that included Felix Anudike-Uzomah, Rashee Rice and Wanya Morris, a group that hasn't come close to matching that impact for one reason or another.

And yet, Kansas City keeps winning.

The Bills tell a similar story: Their 2024 class, led by Keon Coleman, hasn't delivered early returns, especially compared to a strong 2022 group that produced James Cook, Khalil Shakir, Christian Benford and Terrel Bernard after missing on Kaiir Elam in Round 1. But none of that has fundamentally altered their place in the standings.

The presence of a franchise quarterback raises the floor so dramatically that draft outcomes become marginal gains rather than existential turning points. When that position is stable, a "bad" draft rarely derails a season. When there is no franchise QB to lean on, however, even a "great" draft can't save one.

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Zachary Pereles

Draft grades are useful -- if we use them correctly

These grades, no matter how detailed, come from a single perspective -- mine. My board, my positional values, my interpretation of traits and production. That doesn't make them wrong, but it does mean they aren't definitive.

Every evaluator has biases. Maybe you value route-running nuance over raw athleticism. Maybe you prioritize trench play more than others. Maybe you're more skeptical of certain positions or archetypes. Those preferences shape how you see a class -- and how you grade it. That holds true for me and my process, too.

Meanwhile, NFL teams are operating with entirely different information: medical reports, interviews, psychological profiles, probabilistic models, AI and scheme-specific requirements. What looks like a "reach" from the outside might be a perfect fit internally.

So when I assign a grade, I'm not declaring a universal truth about draft philosophy. I'm offering an informed opinion rooted in my process and based on my sources. It's a data point, not a verdict.

And over time, those data points still matter.

They reveal patterns. They show which teams consistently align with sound process, which ones chase need over value, which ones deviate from their own tendencies. They highlight discipline -- or lack thereof. When I layer those observations across multiple years, they offer a peek into organizational behavior.

What draft grades can't do is predict wins and losses. There are too many variables. Scheme changes can redefine roles. Development paths diverge. Coaches get fired. And injuries can undo it all. For me, the lesson isn't that draft grades are useless. It's that they need to be contextualized.

They are snapshots of belief -- a record of what we thought we knew, what teams appeared to value and how those decisions aligned with my evaluations and big board. They capture intent more than outcome.

And when we revisit them years later, they become something more meaningful. Not a scoreboard, but a lens. A way to examine process, question assumptions and better understand how unpredictable the path from draft weekend to on-field success really is.

So yes, draft grades are, in many ways, silly. They're immediate, imperfect and often proven wrong over time. But they're also insightful -- not because they predict the future, but because they reveal how we try to make sense of it.